Shu Yi Oei
Boston College Law School’s Regulation and Markets workshop series continues today. Professor Rory Van Loo (BU Law) will present “Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of FinTech.”
This Article examines recent financial technology (“fintech”) developments to diagnose the federal regulatory architecture surrounding innovation. Startups offer artificially intelligent financial assistants, touchless payments, and other potentially game-changing products for individuals. Yet unlike more lightly regulated industries such as retail goods, in consumer finance barriers to entry have insulated the largest businesses from competition. Regulatory insulation helps explain why too big to fail banks have become bigger, U.S. innovation has lagged that of foreign countries, and consumers pay higher prices.
Taking an institutional lens to this problem reveals an overlooked shortcoming in financial regulation: The organizational design of the administrative agencies responsible for enforcing competition. The current framework was built in the wake of financial instability and consumer protection crises, and its organizational design reflects those priorities. Competition enforcement for consumer finance is spread across five entities, including the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve, each of which focuses on other industries or missions. In particular, agencies whose primary goal is to prevent banks from failing have insufficient incentive to ensure those same banks face competition. As a result, no regulator is optimally structured either to develop licenses suitable for startups or to address banks’ anticompetitive conduct.
The stakes of getting innovation competition right are increasing. Effective competition enforcement could enable new entrants to reduce the size of the largest banks—providing a partial market solution to taxpayer bailouts and to a major economic stability threat. It would also force U.S. banks to prepare for an increasingly borderless financial world in which virtual currencies bypass regulators. Inept competition enforcement could bring opposite results. As Google, Microsoft, and Facebook have shown, technology firms tend to capture higher market shares than those in other industries, often well over 60 percent. If a large bank were to attain similar shares, it could destabilize the financial system. Reallocating competition authority to a motivated financial agency would better position regulators to safeguard the future of finance.
If you’re an academic in the Boston area, please feel free to join us. You can send me email for more information.
By: Diane Ring
Today, the Guardian is reporting that big-four accounting firm Deloitte suffered a hack back in March, 2017. The underlying attack may have originated in the fall of 2016 and may have allowed access to Deloitte systems for several months.
Deloitte itself is not unfamiliar with cybersecurity. As stated on its website, among the services that Deloitte offers clients is Cyber Risk. However, being a victim of a hack provides a new perspective. At this point, details are scarce on exactly which clients have been affected and what specific information may have been accessed, but it has been reported that “confidential emails and plans of some of its blue-chip clients” may have been compromised. This doesn’t sound good. But it is also no surprise.
Leaks and hacks can target a wide variety of data including business plans, mergers and acquisitions, scientific developments, business forecasts, individual identities, and government records. In recent years, tax-related information has proven especially attractive to leakers and hackers. As my co-author, Shu-Yi Oei and I explored in our recent article, Leak-Drive Law studying tax leaks that have occurred over the past 10 years, tax information can be valuable and their release by leakers can have powerful impacts. Moreover, as the tax community has embraced increased reporting and transparency to the government, the number of caches of well-organized data held by corporations, tax advisers and governments increases. Such caches may be magnets for those seeking to hack into it or leak it.
As we continue to move forward in this new world, what do we know? Continue reading “Tax Leaks: The New Normal?”
By: Leandra Lederman
A hot topic among professors at the recent ABA Tax Section meeting in Austin was the reduction in travel support for academics scheduled to take effect with the upcoming meeting in San Diego. As Prof. Bryan Camp wrote on TaxProf blog, The background is that, for years, and through the most recent meeting, full-time professors who have a leadership role in the section (Chair or Vice-Chair of a committee, or higher positions) have received a travel subsidy. The subsidy consists of $100/night toward actual hotel expenses, reimbursement of coach airfare (up to a mileage-based cap*), and $10 towards local transportation. Full-time professors speaking on panels who are not in leadership have also long received a travel subsidy, which I believe is the same as for professors in leadership, except without the $100/night towards hotel room cost. The Tax Section recently decided to eliminate the subsidy for academics, except for those who meet the Section’s definition of “young lawyer,” which has been reported as under age 40 or less than 5 years in practice. (I’m not sure how the “less than 5 years in practice” works, but I imagine it refers to something like bar membership, so that someone like me, who practiced for less than 5 years before entering academia in 1994, would not qualify.)
What’s so sad about this decision is that Tax Section meeting attendance by academics is likely to drop off markedly, although academics add a lot to the Section, as discussed further below. The Teaching Taxation Committee will suffer significantly, and so will other committees with many professors in leadership. It will also be harder to get faculty to speak on panels. There are several factors that will drive this effect:
- Law school budgets, and notably travel budgets, have been cut significantly in the wake of student application declines nationally that began in about 2011. My school continues to be generous, but I have heard from so many professors I have lost count about reduced, often dramatically reduced, annual travel budgets for faculty–budgets that may not support more than one or two conferences a year, for example. Continue reading “Analysis of the ABA Tax Section’s Reduced Travel Support for Academics”
By: Diane Ring
Complaints regarding the international tax system’s ability to handle the digital economy (think Google, Amazon, and a myriad of online service providers) are now ubiquitous. The heart of the problem is two-fold: (1) technology allows these corporations to effectively conduct business in a country without a physical presence there, and (2) much of these businesses’ value derives from intangibles whose value can be difficult to document.
The first reality limits a host country’s ability, under current law, to assert jurisdiction to tax the businesses. The second means that for core transactions by these businesses, such as licensing intangibles to related parties, it can be very difficult for the tax authorities to guarantee that the transactions are at arm’s length prices (and not shifting profit into low tax jurisdictions). The topic is pervasive enough to have merited its own Action Item in the ongoing OECD BEPS Project (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting).
However, a real, coordinated global response has been much harder to secure. This week, the European Commission (EC) made its most recent foray into the debate with a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. But the EC was not just talking to European Union (EU) bodies; it was directly speaking to the OECD and EU member states. What exactly is the EC’s goal with this Communication?
Bottom line the EC seems to have several intersecting objectives: (1) clarify the problem, (2) identify and prod global actors, (3) delineate proper approaches, and (4) warn about the implications of nonaction. Continue reading “European Commission Prods OECD, EU, and Members States on Digital Taxation: An Analysis”
Last Thursday, the House passed an appropriations bill by a vote of 211 to 198. At this point, it’s anybody’s guess how much of the appropriations bill will survive the Senate, but, just in case, it’s worth taking a look at it. And, it turns out, the House really wants to use the appropriations bill to regulate the IRS. Some of the provisions strike me as warranted. Some innocuous. Some strike me as bizarre, payback, perhaps, for long-held grudges. And some strike me as downright insidious. In this post I’m going to focus on the last two categories because frankly, they’re more fun to write about.
The provisions that regulate IRS behavior can be found in sections 101-116 of the appropriations bill. And what provisions are bizarre payback or downright insidious? Continue reading “FY 2018 Appropriations Bill and the IRS”
Shu Yi Oei
UPDATE 9/19/17: I blogged more about Omarova & Hockett’s National Investment Authority suggestion over on Taxprof Blog. You can read the post here.
Today, Boston College Law School welcomes Professor Saule Omarova (Cornell) as the first presenter in our inaugural Regulation and Markets Workshop Series. The paper (with Robert Hockett, also of Cornell) is entitled “Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority.” It’s available on SSRN.
Here’s the abstract:
The American Presidential election of 2016 was won under the rhetorical banner of returning America to its past productive glory. Any such undertaking presents an extraordinary challenge, demanding a correspondingly extraordinary institutional response. This Article proposes precisely such a response. It designs and advocates a new public instrumentality – a National Investment Authority (“NIA”) – charged with the critical task of devising and implementing a comprehensive long-term development strategy for the United States.
Patterned in part after the New Deal-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in part after modern sovereign wealth funds, and in part after private equity and venture capital firms, the NIA is an inherently hybrid, public-private entity that combines the unique strengths of public instrumentalities – their vast scale, lengthy investment horizons, and explicit backing by the public’s full faith and credit – with the micro-informational advantages of private market actors. By creatively adapting familiar tools of financial and legal engineering, the NIA overcomes obstacles that ordinarily impede or discourage private investment in critically necessary and even transformative public infrastructure goods. By channeling presently speculative private capital back into the real-economy, moreover, the NIA plays an important role in enhancing the resilience and stability of the U.S. and global financial systems.
The Article makes original contributions not only to contemporary policy debates over how to revive America’s productive prowess and bring its financial system back into the service of the real economy, but also to current theoretical understandings of “public goods” and how to provide them. It offers a more complete and coherent account of such goods as solutions to collective action problems that pervade decentralized markets, hence as goods that can be supplied only through exercises of collective agency. The NIA proposal advanced in the Article operationalizes this theoretical insight by elaborating a specific institutional form that such collective agency can take.
The paper is really interesting and I have many swirling thoughts. I’ll say more after the workshop.
I’ve been known to occasionally get bored at work, notwithstanding my job being the best job in the world and taxes being one of the most interesting topics in the world. For better or worse, when I’m bored, I can always turn to the internet for entertainment. Of course, as we know, that wasn’t always the case.
I’ve been looking at nineteenth-century tax assessment lists for a project I’m working on. The lists are fairly sterile, mostly a series of names, with the amount of income and various types of property that each individual had. Copying the various assessments to the formal assessment book must have been relatively mind-numbing work, especially for assistant assessors who were grossly underpaid.[fn1] Also, they were overworked:
Perhaps the most burdensome administrative tasks fell on the assessors, the workhorses of the collection staff. Their offices were kept open at all hours. They were required to issue a summons after notice to make returns had been issued, to hear appeals, examine taxable property, accept income tax returns, and audit returns for correctness.[fn2]
Continue reading “Boredom and Taxes”
By Sam Brunson
Last week, the Free Beacon ran an exposé of the Southern Poverty Law Center, making four principal claims. First, the Free Beacon said, the SPLC was keeping literally tons of money in offshore tax haven investment funds and bank accounts. Second, it spends too much on fundraising. Third, it overpays its executives. Fourth, it underspends on its mission.
The problem with the exposé? At best it misunderstands what’s going on, and at worst, it is flagrantly wrong.
I’m usually not interested in doing fact-check-style responses, but I’m going to nonetheless. The accusations Schoffstall levels sound plausible, so it’s worth explaining why and how they’re wrong.[fn1] Continue reading “Responding to the SPLC “Exposé””