On Friday, the Senate confirmed Neil Gorsuch as the newest Justice on the Supreme Court, and today he was officially sworn in, taking the seat that Justice Scalia’s passing left vacant.
When Justice Scalia passed away, I looked at the tax opinions he had authored. It turns out, Justice Scalia didn’t author a whole lot of tax opinions, and those that he did author were, as I said, “workmanlike,” without the verbal pyrotechnics, wit, and flair he was known for.
I was curious whether Justice Gorsuch would bring anything different to that seat, so I looked for tax opinions he had authored.[fn1] My search terms brought up 34 hits; the vast majority were not actually cases dealing with the federal income tax.[fn2] In fact, I only saw two cases dealing with federal income tax issues, and neither of them really dealt with the tax law. Continue reading “Neil Gorsuch and the Tax Law”
Photo: Jarrad Henderson, USA TODAY
By: Daniel Hemel and David Herzig
[Note: This post is co-authored with Daniel Hemel, Assistant Professor of Law at The University of Chicago School of Law.]
The strategic case against a Democratic filibuster of Neil Gorsuch is straightforward. The argument is not that the filibuster will prevent President Trump from putting someone like Andrew Napolitano on the Court. The argument is that the filibuster may prevent President Trump from filling a future vacancy with a well-credentialed conservative who is ideologically similar to or right of Judge Gorsuch. To elaborate:
— (a) The filibuster accomplishes no work when there are fewer than 50 Senators who will support a nominee on an up-or-down vote. (Napolitano presumably falls into this category.)
— (b) The filibuster also does no work when there are 50 or more Senators who will support a nominee even if that means going nuclear. (Judge Gorsuch appears to fall into this category.)
— (c) The filibuster matters when (1) there is a nominee who would win 50 or more Senators on an up-or-down vote, but (2) fewer than 50 Senators would support the nuclear option in order to put the nominee on the Court.
Is (c) an empty set?
Continue reading “The Strategic Case Against the Democratic Filibuster of Neil Gorsuch”
By: David J. Herzig
Earlier this year, the Washington Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the legislature’s amendment to a Business & Occupation (B&O) tax exemption revising the definition of “direct seller’s representative” to conform to the Washington Department of Revenue’s interpretation of the exemption did not violate a taxpayer’s rights under due process, collateral estoppel, or separation of powers principle.
Like most states, Washington had a B&O tax for “the act or privilege of engaging in business activities.” Under the original law, out-of-state sellers were exempt if they acted through a representative. DOT Foods shows up in Washington and sells through a wholly owned subsidiary to avoid the B&O tax.
In 1999, the Washington Department of Revenue changed its interpretation of the statute to subject DOT and others to the B&O tax. Dot challenged that change (215 P.3d 185 (Wash. 2009) “DOT I”)) and won. DOT I applied for the tax periods 2000-2006.
DOT then sought a refund for the period Jan. 2005 – Aug. 2009 (not the time period of DOT I). In the meantime, in 2010 the Washington State Legislature changed Wash. Rev. Code Sec. 82.04.423(2) in response to the DOT I ruling. The statute both retroactively and prospectively changed the statute. Based on the statutory change, the Washington Department of Revenue rejected the refund claim.
For the period covered by DOT I, DOT and Washington agreed on a settlement for a 97% refund for B&O taxes paid. For the May 2006 to December 2007 period (after DOT I), the refund request was denied. DOT challenged the retroactive application under the theories of collateral estoppel, separation of powers, and due process. DOT lost in the Washington Supreme Court and now has appealed to the US Supreme Court.
The test for whether or not retroactive tax legislation satisfies Due Process is United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). Carlton applied a rational basis test. The Court stated retroactive tax legislation would not violate due process if, “legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.” According to the ACTC brief, “The Washington Supreme Court ignored the unique circumstances of the Carlton case, which involved the correction of an obvious legislative error that was identified very soon after the statute was enacted and which the taxpayer was admittedly exploiting for its own benefit.”
Continue reading “Will the Supreme Court Hear a Retroactive Taxation Case This Term?”